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The Social Dimension of Legal
Uncertainty
Reconciling Law and Science in the Formative Years of Pragmatism
Frederic Kellogg
Almost everyone knows Lord Mansfield’s advice to
a man of practical good sense, who, being
appointed governor of a colony, has to preside in
its courts of justice, without previous judicial
practice or legal education. The advice was to give
his decision boldly, for it would probably be right,
but never to venture on assigning reasons, for they
would almost infallibly be wrong.
John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, 1843
1 The above passage, from J. S. Mill’s A System of Logic, is part of Mill’s contribution in the
19th century to a debate (with Bishop Whately) over whether the logical syllogism “is, or
is not, a process of inference; a progress from the known to the unknown: a means of
coming to a knowledge of something which we did not know before.” Mill employs a
familiar  story  about  Lord  Mansfield  to  support  his  contention  that  reasoning  is
inaccurately  depicted  by  the  classic  syllogistic  form.  Rather  than being  informed by
generals, “[a]ll inference is from particulars to particulars.” The formal syllogism, says
Mill, adds nothing to logical thought: “Not one iota is added to the proof by interpolating
a general proposition” (Mill, 1862: 232). Mill continues:
Since the individual cases are all the evidence we can possess, evidence which no
logical form into which we choose to throw it can make greater than it is; and since
that evidence is either sufficient in itself, or, if insufficient for the one purpose, can
not be sufficient for the other; I am unable to see why we should be forbidden to
take  the  shortest  cut  from  these  sufficient  premises  to  the  conclusion,  and
constrained to travel the “high priori road,” by the arbitrary fiat of logicians. (Mill,
1862: 232-3)
2 The illustratory  example  chosen here  is  drawn from law –  specifically  from judicial
practice.  This  passage  introduces  my  subject,  the  social  dimension  of  thought:  in
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particular, with regard to the disparate fields of law and science, as conceived in the
formative  years  of  pragmatism.  The  Lord  Mansfield  story  suggests  the  difficulty  of
applying syllogistic inference to unique disputes for the individual observer. The young
Oliver  Wendell  Holmes  Jr,  immersed  in  the  records  of  actual  cases,  suggested  an
explanation.  The  syllogism  models  how  the  mind  operates  to  justify  knowledge  of
undisputedly similar facts; but judges are engaged in resolving disputed facts.
3 They are also part of a community of inquiry, consisting of other judges, lawyers, and
indeed the parties affected by the disputes in question. Influenced by peers in Cambridge,
perhaps also by his recent experience in the Civil War, Holmes looked to the effects of
society on thought,  and the question of  how a community resolves doubt and reaches
conclusions.
4 In the period before the American Civil  War, Mill  was engaged in another celebrated
debate, with William Whewell, over the nature and grounds of scientific discovery. The
young post-war intellectuals in Cambridge, Massachusetts (the founders of pragmatism,
gathering in  the so-called “Metaphysical  Club”)  were keenly  aware of  it.  Some were
reading its main sources, including Mill’s Logic and Whewell’s Philosophy of the Inductive
Sciences, even as they designed their own radical naturalist approach to knowledge that
would later be called pragmatism.
5 The passage from Mill connects the pragmatist interest in the logic of science with the
logic of law, in a common vision of social inquiry. Max Fisch noted in 1942 (Fish, 1942)
that half the membership of the early Metaphysical Club consisted of scientists and half
lawyers, and that the two perspectives informed each other. Some evidence of this may
be found in the diary of reading kept by the young Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., recently
returned from the battles of the Civil War. Even while immersing himself in legal treatises
and a daunting revision of the encyclopedic Kent’s Commentaries on American Law, Holmes
was discussing philosophy with William James and Chauncey Wright, and, after attending
a lecture on Mill by Charles Peirce, slogging through Mill’s lengthy and dense System of
Logic in 1866.
6 Holmes’s principal work, The Common Law (1881), notably begins with the famous passage,
“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed”(1881:  1).  This community-conscious comment warrants a look at  the early
period of Holmes’s writing to explore his thought about the syllogism.
7 In  1870 we find Holmes,  in  a  formative  essay on law,  repeating Mill’s  story of  Lord
Mansfield’s  comment,  in  a  text  which  addresses  the  relationship  of  particulars  and
generals in the law:
It is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and determines the
principle afterwards… In cases of first  impression Lord Mansfield’s  often-quoted
advice to the business man who was suddenly appointed judge, that he should state
his conclusions and not give his reasons, as his judgment would probably be right
and the reasons certainly wrong, is not without its application to more educated
courts. It is only after a series of determinations on the same subject-matter, that it
becomes  necessary  to  “reconcile  the  cases,”  as  it  is  called,  that  is,  by  a  true
induction to state the principle which has until then been obscurely felt. And this
statement is often modified more than once by new decisions before the abstracted
general rule takes its final shape. A well settled legal doctrine embodies the work of
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many minds, and has been tested in form as well as substance by trained critics
whose practical interest it is to resist it at every step. (Holmes, 1870: 1)
8 Here, Holmes appears to have absorbed Mill’s rejection of the syllogism and his vision of
“reasoning from particulars to particulars.” But the relation of particulars to generals is
different. Holmes adds an element of the emergence of generals from particulars, entirely
missing from Mill’s account. Whereas Mill had set forth his argument as a rejection of
classical logical form, Holmes goes on to address how, in an historical simulation, general
rules are attained in a progression from particular judgments to consensually negotiated
generals. It would occupy a key place in his thought and career, a vision that he would
much later  characterize as  showing the “morphology of  human ideas” –  or  how the
common law might be viewed as an historical study in the way society thinks.
9 What Holmes adds is  an addendum to Mill’s  “Not  one iota is  added to the proof  by
interpolating  a  general  proposition”  (1862:  232).  Where  Mill  simply  dismisses  that
assumption, Holmes seeks a deeper explanation of the relation of particular judgments to
general propositions.  Focusing on the nature and origin of the general itself,  Holmes
attributes its emergence to a “series of determinations on the same subject.” These are
not already given, as they arguably are in the classic example “all men are mortal,” but
represent separate judgments in varying circumstances by a community of inquirers, viz.,
the disparate courts of law.
10 The  topic  of  interest  to  Mill  was  a  simple  confusion  over  logical  form;  the  general
proposition “all men are mortal” is but a set of unquestionably comparable particulars.
But what if the particulars are not patently comparable, as in a set of novel situations or
judgments? Then it is certainly not appropriate to “take the shortest cut from premises to
conclusion,” as Mill puts it (1862: 233). Holmes has highlighted a distinct problem, that of
social classification and the emergence of consensus. If the very “general” in question is
yet unestablished,  a new realm of issues is opened up. Instead of how the individual
thinks,  it  is  how society thinks,  how new generalized beliefs  are formed despite  the
inevitable conflict of perceptions and views.
11 The great  debate  between Mill  and Whewell  is  nearly  forgotten  today,  even though
recently  analyzed in  detail  by  Snyder  (2010).  It  was  fresh in  the minds  of  the  early
Metaphysical Club, and it is a necessary resource to put the origins of pragmatism in full
perspective.  Recovering  this  perspective  now is  difficult,  especially  given  the  recent
transformation of pragmatist philosophy by a dominant analytical attitude, flourishing
(even while diverse) with W. V. O. Quine, R. Rorty, R. Brandom and others.
12 An aid to recovering the earlier  perspective is  Whewell’s  own preface to the second
edition of his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840), a passage in a book that Holmes
appears to have listed in the diary of his reading in 1866-7:
On the subject of this doctrine of a Fundamental Analysis, which our knowledge
always  involves,  I  will  venture  here  to  add  a  remark,  which  looks  beyond  the
domain of the physical sciences. This doctrine is suited to throw light upon Moral
and Political Philosophy, no less than upon Physical. In Morality, in Legislation, in
National Polity,  we have still  to do with the opposition and combination of two
Elements; of Facts and Ideas; of History, and an Ideal Standard of Action; of actual
character and position, and of the aims which are placed above the Actual. Each of
these is in conflict with the other; each modifies and moulds the other. We can
never escape the control of the first; we must ever cease to strive to extend the
sway of the second. In these cases, indeed, the Ideal Element assumes a new form. It
includes the Idea of Duty. The opposition, the action and re-action, the harmony at
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which we must ever aim, and can never reach, are between what is and what ought
to be; between the past or present Fact, and the Supreme Idea. The Idea can never
be independent of the Fact, but the Fact must ever be drawn towards the Idea. - The
History of Human Societies, and of each Individual, is by the moral philosopher,
regarded in reference to this Antithesis; and thus both Public and Private Morality
becomes an actual progress towards an Ideal Form; or ceases to be a moral reality.
(1840: x-xi)
13 The passage summarizes a thesis regarding the relation of the particular to the general in
the historical progress of science, Whewell’s “doctrine of a Fundamental Analysis,” and
claims that it should “throw light upon Moral and Political Philosophy, no less than upon
Physical.” As such it might be seen as a call to joining the two disparate areas of inquiry
that the club, and in particular Holmes, would follow.
14 What was Whewell’s thesis? Without getting deeply into the body of his work, it is the
idea of a reciprocal and research-centered growth of knowledge created by a tension
between  the  particular  and  the  general:  the  opposition,  interaction,  and  eventual
“colligation” (a form of combination or negotiation) of the two critical elements, “facts
and ideas.” These, he says, tend to be seen as in “conflict” with each other, but over time
“modify  and  mould”  each  other. Moreover,  the  tension  between  them  is  itself
transformative; as inquiry progresses, “the Ideal Element assumes a new form.” Further,
they progress toward a “harmony at which we must ever aim, and can never reach… The
Idea can never be independent of the Fact, but the Fact must ever be drawn towards the
Idea” (1840: xi).
15 The epistemic context implied by this is social, rather than strictly individual. Whewell
implies a process engaging an extended community of inquirers,  both physically and
chronologically. Moreover, he insists that it is applicable not just to natural science but to
moral and political philosophy. Given that Whewell’s work was read and discussed in the
semi-organized meetings of Metaphysical Club members, and clearly influenced Peirce’s
notion of abduction and fallibilism, it may also have supported Holmes’s 1870 idea of
“successive approximation.” The precise genealogy of a common perspective among the
Cambridge intellectuals is elusive, but my purpose here is to highlight a common thread:
understanding the social dimensions of knowledge, and the relation of intersubjective
classification to the resolution of doubt and uncertainty.
16 The epistemic context of social classification is diachronic and transitional, whereas the
syllogism is synchronic and analytical. For the latter, doubt is largely a failure of fit. For
the former, it is a matter of provisional responsive adjustment to the arrangement of a
changing order. For Mill, the reason why Lord Mansfield’s hypothetical decision-maker
should “never venture on assigning reasons” is his intuitive sense of similarity; but for
Holmes, it is the distinctive future significance of a novel problem. The situation itself is
new, a “case of first impression,” having key aspects yet to be classified. The bearing of
particular to general for Holmes is not one of logical relation but consensual emergence,
integration from repeated experience into a dynamic and always emergent system of
order. This attitude implies a distinct approach to uncertainty, as experience yet to be
integrated within a moving system of classification.
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1. Social Dimensions of Legal Uncertainty
17 At about the period in which the Club was active, Holmes published the above-quoted
essay  (1870)  in  which  he  referred  to  the  process  of  common  law  interpretation  as
proceeding by “successive  approximation.”  While  he did  not  reiterate  this  term,  the
concept behind it  reappears throughout his career,  woven into his conception of the
judicial role in legal interpretation generally, whether strictly engaging common law, or
later even aspects of statutory and constitutional law. “New cases will arise which will
elude the most carefully constructed formula. The common law, proceeding, as we have
pointed out, by a series of successive approximations – by a continual reconciliation of
cases – is prepared for this, and simply modifies the form of its rule.” (Holmes, 1870: 2).
18 What might here be called Holmes’s “legal fallibilism” is, like Peirce’s, a response to new
experience: no general formulation can ever be “final.” A flexible system of law requires
constant retrospective reclassification of disputes. This is assumed by the common law
tradition – the day-to-day and case-by-case operation of English and American courts of
law. This argument requires holding in abeyance the conventional conception of law as
dominated by legislation, with the main mechanism of social choice through law deriving
from  representative  democracy  at  all  levels.  Holmes  preached  deference  to  clear
legislative language, but recognized the ongoing need to fill in the “interstices.”
19 In  an  ambiguous  area  the  common  law  process  begins  with  intuitive  particular
judgments. It is a process parallel to that of Peirce’s community of scientists engaged in
the exploration of  a common and ongoing,  but specific,  problem. The “many minds”
mentioned in the passage include trained judges, as well as lawyers on opposing sides of a
succession  of  recurring  disputes  that,  when  arising  at  the  first  instance,  are  better
resolved  without  prejudgment  according  to  deduction  from  a  preexisting  principle.
Hence the “business man suddenly appointed judge” should decide the case on its facts
but refrain from explanation, and the same indeed goes for “more educated courts.” The
caution  against  premature  generalization  applies  to  the  expert  as  well  as  to  the
unspecialized.
20 An early decision in an emergent controversy operates akin to a scientific experiment; it
opens inquiry by creating a potential precedent for future similar cases. Like the record
of  scientific  inquiry,  that  of  legal  inquiry  consists  at  first  of  carefully  recorded
observation  of  multiple  concrete  experiences.  The  “business  man”  to  whom Holmes
alludes was acting in this instance more like a jury than a judge, and the role of juries has,
since their emergence as deciders of factual questions, been to reach a decision without
legal explanation from their findings on the evidence.
21 Multiple evidentiary findings can reveal similarities. After an accumulation of particular
decisions discloses a pattern, according to Holmes’s text, lawyers and judges initiate the
process of generalizing. In law, as perhaps in science, it is only after sufficient experience
establishes a clear pattern that trained observers may begin to “abstract” a “general
rule.” And, as roughly also in science, this is done by “reconciling the cases,” which refers
to the distinguishing of relevant from irrelevant detail in the articulation of a common
rule or standard. Relevance, of evidence to ultimate conclusion, in both law and science,
is an emergent property. As the notion of relevance emerges, so also does the perception
– or imposition – of coherence.
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22 This  suggests  a  parallel  between  scientists  and  lawyers  evaluating  and  generalizing
within an established professional tradition from records of diverse but related data. The
data itself, in science and law, would appear radically distinct, but there is a sense in
which the two forms of inquiry are comparable. Both are prompted by practical problems
or doubts confronting the community at large, reflecting Peirce’s doubt-belief model of
inquiry. In both, informal and non-professional attempts to resolve such problems, once
burdened  by  something  akin  to  superstition,  have  been  replaced  by  formal  and
professionalized analysis. The practical understanding underlying legal disputes has, as
Holmes suggested in The Common Law (1881), supplanted a primitive culture of revenge,
even as we might say that science has supplanted animism and superstition. In both,
abstraction and systematic  classification have been accompanied by new practices  of
description and conceptual objectification.
23 Both legal and scientific knowledge might be viewed as forms of community inquiry,
focusing  on  the  primacy  of  cases  and  exemplars  in  the  process  of  intersubjective
classification, and on the dual role of concepts and theories in both guiding the conduct
of professional inquirers and framing and maintaining the coherence and consistency of
both expert and general belief.
 
2. Conflict and the Resolution of Inconsistency
24 Peirce commented in 1869 that Whewell “has shown with great elaboration that in every
science two processes have taken place. One, the observation and grouping of facts. The
other, controversies which resulted in the establishment of clear conceptions” (W2: 340).
The law is plainly driven by controversy, and Holmes elaborates on this. Legal concepts
demarcating rights and duties are cognitive products of opposing as well as prevailing
patterns of conduct, gathered and evaluated by courts of law. When legal rights are seen
to conflict in the abstract, the conflicts are best resolved on an experimental, case-by-
case basis, just as the conflicting rights were themselves individually framed.
25 If this “fallibilist” account of the emergence of legal concepts is even roughly accurate, it
should illuminate  the challenge of  resolving conflicts  among legal  rights  and duties.
Emergent  rights  are  rooted  in  individual  judgments,  by  jurors  and  others  like  the
“business man,” made by comparing injurious with prudent conduct. The grounds on
which such judgments  are  initially  made is  the familiarity  of  juries  and judges  with
prevailing standards of conduct in the community at large, with respect to the activity
engaged in when an injury has occurred. In some matters there is yet to exist a prevalent
standard. The very process of particular judgment is part of the process of framing –
indeed of the process that Whewell refers to as “moulding.”
26 The chronology, and diachronicity, of this process is important. Standards of conduct are
preceded  by,  and  drawn  from,  patterns  of  activity.  The  standards  of  prudence  are
inferred from familiarity with the better ways that things are being done, with particular
concern to ground judgments upon that which is seen to be the prudent or ‘correct’ way.
Failure to display a certain kind of light on a ship at night, which has become a common
practice to decrease the likelihood of collision, becomes, through repeated common law
decisions, a reason for strict liability for collisions whenever the light was absent. Thus
may common practice lead by accumulation of judgments to a legal duty.
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27 In this admittedly simplified account, legal concepts demarcating rights and duties are
cognitive products of prevailing patterns of conduct as gathered and evaluated by courts
of law. This has special relevance for the methodology of resolving conflicts. When legal
rights are seen to conflict  in the abstract,  Holmes’s  account denies that they can be
“balanced” in the abstract. Rather, the conflicts have to be resolved on an experimental,
case-by-case basis,  just as the conflicting rights were themselves individually framed.
Here is how Holmes described the process of conflict resolution in 1873:
The growth of the law is very apt to take place in this way: Two widely different
cases suggest a general distinction, which is a clear one when stated broadly. But as
new cases cluster around the opposite poles, and begin to approach each other, the
distinction becomes more difficult to trace; the determinations are made one way
or  the  other  on  a  very  slight  preponderance  of  feeling,  rather  than  articulate
reason;  and at  last  a  mathematical  line is  arrived at  by the contact  of  contrary
decisions, which is so far arbitrary that it might equally well have been drawn a
little further to the one side or to the other. (Holmes, 1873: 654)
28 In this description, as in the 1870 text, conflicts among existing rights are not resolved at
once, through interpretation and application of an antecedent underlying set of legal
principles. Instead they are gradually explored, first by gathering new experience, and
then by appropriately timed retrospective examinations of  an array of  specific  prior
decisions. Holmes describes a process whereby the new cases are seen as gradually filling
a metaphorical space between the two rules (“cluster[ing] around the opposite poles”).
Judges eventually resolve the conflict by recognizing and describing a “line” between the
opposing poles or principles.
29 Ultimately the conflict may be resolved by the reasoned analysis of an appellate court.
What that means is not deduction from a priori principles but a retrospective accounting
for the various dimensions revealed by successive decisions.  Despite the emphasis  of
specific judgments,  there is  no attempt here to avoid the language of objectification;
indeed Holmes deploys a concrete metaphor of “line drawing” to emphasize the primary
role of particular decisions. Each new decision is recorded in his account as a point on a
metaphorical line defining the boundary between still-evolving separate categories. This
image of a “clustering” of cases prompts a comparison with scientific research as more
recently  described  by  Barry  Barnes,  David Bloor  and  John  Henry  (founders  of  the
“Edinburgh school” of science studies) in Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis (1996),
noting that,  in science also,  a  “cluster of  instances is  all  that  ostensive learning can
provide to convey the sense of sameness” (Barnes, Bloor & Henry, 1996: 49).
To describe the growth of scientific knowledge as a movement from one problem to
the next on the basis of analogy and direct modeling is to offer a finitist account of
the  process…  A  class  is  its  accepted  instances  at  a  given  point  in  time:  those
instances are the existing resources for deciding what else belongs in the class, the
available precedents for further acts of classification, the basis for further case-to-
case development of the classification. (Barnes, Bloor & Henry, 1996: 105)
30 Holmes in 1873 had taken his approach a step further, in applying it to an account of the
interaction  between  conflicting  or  opposing  classes,  by  his  gradual  and  consensual
drawing of a metaphorical line. In one sense the line may be described as “arbitrary” in
that it “might equally well have been drawn a little further to the one side or to the
other” (1873: 654). In another sense, the account describes a process in which conceptual
products are constructed not unlike physical products. There is no perfect or ideal shape
to law, even as it is repeatedly modified to adapt to new conditions, shaping conduct as it
forms and reforms legal concepts.
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31 From these early and other Holmes texts it appears that the body of law is built up from
legal  categories  and  concepts  formed  by  a  process  akin  to  negotiation,  albeit  an
attenuated one. The whole enterprise must be woven together while being adjusted to
accommodate  shifting  standards  guiding  future  conduct.  Different  cases,  situations,
parties, judges, and lawyers (and, of course, scholars) are all involved over a continuum,
as  diverse  judgments  are  analyzed  and  interpreted  to  forge  eventual  settlements  of
multiple controversies. Overall consistency is a dominant goal, but conceptual analysis is
only partly an exercise in logical reconciliation. It is also one of negotiating each new
requirement for conduct through the clash of conflicting patterns of conduct already
prevalent.
 
3. Syllogistic Logic Socialized
32 On October 24 1866, Holmes attended the first in a series of twelve Lowell Lectures by
Charles S. Peirce in Boston, Massachusetts. Peirce’s topic for the series was “The Logic of
Science,  or,  Induction and Hypothesis.”  The first  lecture,  an examination of  types of
deductive syllogism, Peirce introduced apologetically as
an exceedingly dry subject which I cannot hope to make entertaining; but the great
importance of which to everyone who is to use his mind at all ought to render it
interesting… Logic is a much abused science. Like Medicine, Law, and in short any
branch of knowledge which has important practical bearings, it is… no more perfect
than any other product of humanity and we have the same right to be dissatisfied
with its present state that we have with everything else that we are in a condition to
improve. (W1: 358, Peirce’s emphasis)
33 Holmes’s daily diary, kept for just two years in the period following his return from the
Civil  War, reveals that he would attend only the first four of Peirce’s lectures,  which
included diagramming and analyzing various Aristotelean and Theoprastian syllogisms,
comments on Zeno, John Locke, Augustus De Morgan, William Hamilton, David Hume,
James and [John] Stuart Mill, eventually (in Lecture Three) producing a bag full of colored
balls and removing them one by one to demonstrate the experience of induction. His
fourth lecture moved from the bag of balls to an extended critique of J. S. Mill’s treatment
of the syllogism in A System of Logic.
34 A comment by Peirce in Lecture Two, that may have influenced Holmes, came after a
warning against  abuses of  the syllogistic form. “[T]o say that If  the wind is  east  the
barometer rises, is equivalent to saying Every east wind makes the barometer rise. But
such a transformation will not enable us to throw arguments into syllogistic form.” The
example Peirce gave was:
If the wind is east the barometer rises
The wind is east
The barometer rises.
35 The problem,  Peirce  noted,  is  that  “we talk  here  of  occasions instead of  things as  in
ordinary propositions; and the objects which our terms denote are bounded by dates not
by positions” (W1:  379-80,  Peirce’s  emphasis).  Perhaps it  occurred to Holmes,  then or
thereafter,  that  legal  decisions  too  are  occasions  bounded  by  dates,  not  things  by
position, and that gathering them together in legal analysis or interpretation was not “an
ordinary proposition.”
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36 Soon after Lecture Four, on November 14, 1866, Holmes borrowed Mill’s A System of Logic
from the Boston Atheneaum and, amidst a severe bout with flu, slogged through its 1100
pages in a week, even while feeling “like a beast” from severe influenza. Four years later,
Lecture Four appears to have born indirect  legal  fruit.  The passage from Mill’s  Logic
commenting on Lord Mansfield would resonate in Holmes’s first essay on legal logic, gain
traction in his  early  essays  on legal  theory,  and lead a  decade later  to  an emphatic
concern in The Common Law with “the paradox of form and substance in the development
of the law”:
In form its growth is logical. The official theory is that each new decision follows
syllogistically from existing precedents. But just as the clavicle in the cat only tells
of  the  existence  of  some  earlier  creature  to  which  a  collarbone  was  useful,
precedents survive in the law long after the use they once served is at an end and
the reason for them is forgotten. The result of following them must often be failure
and confusion from the merely logical point of view. (Holmes, 1881: 35)
37 This  marks  a  full  expression  of  his  philosophy  as  it  had  developed  by  1881.  While
retaining  a  pretense  of  Aristotelean  deduction,  law embodies  an  evolving  system of
classification,  continually  adapting  to  normative  human  demands  as  new  traits  are
introduced  and  old  ones  shrugged  off.  Holmes  stressed  that  the  process  of  legal
classification appears more analytical  than it  is,  in the sense that consistency always
seems to have been discovered, not made.
The truth is, that law hitherto has been, and it would seem by the necessity of its
being is always approaching and never reaching consistency. It is for ever adopting
new principles from life at one end, and it always retains old ones from history at
the other which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off. It will become entirely
consistent only when it ceases to grow. (Holmes, 1881: 36)
38 Many years later, Holmes compared his jurisprudential theory to anthropology:
It is perfectly proper to regard and study the law simply as a great anthropological
document. It is proper to resort to it to discover what ideals of society have been
strong  enough  to  reach  that  final  form  of  expression,  or  what  have  been  the
changes in dominant ideals from century to century. It is proper to study it as an
exercise in the morphology and transformation of human ideas. (Holmes, 1899: 212)
39 Here we find what I have called Holmes’s legal fallibilism (or, in his words, “successive
approximation”) elucidated as a mechanism of an evolutionary theory of knowledge. I
have traced its roots at least in part to Peirce’s 1866 Lowell Lectures, critiquing Mill’s view
of the syllogism.
40 Peirce had begun his  examination of  Mill’s  doctrine of  induction in reference to his
experiment with the bag of balls, having removed seven of them at random, all appearing
to be the same color. How, he asked, do we infer that the others in the bag are also red?
Mill held that “it is essentially an inference from one instance to another.”
Suppose, now, that we ask Mr. Mill this question which we have put to ourselves in
reference to these balls. What is the Ground of Induction? His answer will be, it is
the Uniformity of Nature. It is to the examination of this reply that I propose to
devote the remainder of this lecture. (W1: 413)
41 Peirce challenged Mill’s position for circularity: “to make our warrant for induction (that
is his phrase) proved by induction (again his phrase) he falls into that common fallacy
called  “begging  the  question”  (W1:  414).  Peirce’s  point  goes  to  the  essence  of  Mill’s
disagreement with Whewell, where Mill deflated the role of hypothesis in the observer’s
understanding of individual facts. From where, then, does the sense of similarity derive?
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Mill’s position requires falling back on the notion that observed uniformities are natural,
rather than a result of imaginative human inquiry.
Now in opposition to this  I  would observe that  there are obviously many more
relations in nature which are totally irregular than of those which are uniform.
(W1: 417)
42 This observation was followed by the comment, “Every student of physics knows that a
law which is exactly conformed to in nature without interference from other laws is
almost if not quite unknown. Every law that is discovered therefore is found to after a few
years not to be exact.” (W1: 420).
43 Peirce’s  comments  on  Whewell  a  year  earlier  in  his  Harvard  Lectures  of  1865  are
undeniably sympathetic to “colligation” between scientific facts and ideas, and suggest its
influence on his later references to fallibilism and abduction. Yet, as I have suggested,
Holmes’s immersion in legal research led to a distinct perspective, reflecting the problem
of resolution of ongoing disputes in the law. Assuming Whewell’s influence on both men,
colligation takes on a more pronounced social dimension with Holmes.
44 As noted earlier, legal judgments are not objects with extension, like colored balls in a
bag;  they  are  more  like  the  “occasions”  of  Peirce’s  Lecture  Two.  And,  the  gradual
assessment of legal disputes, and their resolution, is rarely limited to a single mind, or
even  a  succession  of  single  minds.  Colligation  involves  an  ongoing  community  of
reflecting and responding agents. A single legal decision is by no means the whole story
of the resolution of a legal problem. An adequate resolution of doubt must extend to the
entire community of affected actors. The final “colligation,” as in a complicated question
like the legality of affirmative action, assisted suicide, or abortion, may take years or even
generations, and (as Holmes wrote in 1870) “embodies the work of many minds, and has
been tested in form as well as substance by trained critics whose practical interest it is to
resist it at every step” (Holmes 1870: 1).
45 Pragmatic fallibilism, then, is a social phenomenon, denoting the provisional nature of
knowledge as it applies to discrete problems. Whewell’s use of colligation to describe the
emergence of laws and concepts in science fits better with the social element of
pragmatist thought than the syllogism. In Whewell’s wake, law and science may be seen
as branches of the sociology of knowledge. Legal and scientific knowledge can be viewed
broadly as forms of community inquiry, focusing on the primacy of cases and exemplars
in the process  of  intersubjective classification,  and on the dual  role of  concepts  and
theories  in  both  guiding  the  conduct  of  professional  inquirers  and  framing  and
maintaining the coherence and consistency of both expert and general belief.
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ABSTRACTS
Nineteenth-century references to the syllogism by J. S. Mill and Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. reveal
a distinct approach to the logic of inference in the formative years of pragmatism. In the latter
may be found an element of the emergence of generals from particulars. Fallibilism in law and
science reflects their social  dimension as part of  the communal ordering of  experience.  This
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